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  BEYOND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: CANADIAN REFUGEE 
JURISPRUDENCE ON MILITARY SERVICE EVASION 
MARTIN JONES In January 2004, a young man crossed the border into Canada along with 
his wife and young son.  He fled participation in a conflict that was widely 
viewed at the time as being both based upon an illegal invasion and executed, 
at times, contrary to the rules of war.  He claimed he was a simple Quaker 
who was repulsed by the conflict in which he was being ordered to 
participate.  In many respects, he was no different than many of the 30,000 
refugee claimants seeking Canada’s protection every year.  And yet in at 
least two respects he was quite different: he was an American citizen and the 
war he was fleeing was the American occupation of Iraq.  At least in part because of these two features of this young man, he became quite famous. His story, the story 
of Jermey Hinzman, has since been reported on by most of the world’s major print and broadcast media 
outlets.  This reporting has fuelled both admiration and outrage.  American pundits have called for a 
consumer boycott of Canadian goods and services as a result of Mr. Hinzman’s actions.1  He has been 
described by his countrymen and by Canadians as both a coward and a hero. 
 
In the months that have passed since Mr. Hinzman’s arrival in Canada, the media attention has abated.  His 
claim has been heard by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board.2  It is 
currently working its way through the process of judicial review.3  However, while the public expressions of 
the divergent emotions that his refugee claim prompted may have become less frequent, there remains an 
underlying ambivalence towards individuals such as Mr. Hinzman fleeing military service.  It is perhaps not 
surprising, that the jurisprudence in Canada, and elsewhere, is similarly divided  and uncertain about whether
to grant protection to individuals evading military service.  Although Mr. Hinzman’s claim was raised in the 
context of the all-volunteer force of the United States Armed Forces, in most cases, the ground of military 
service evasion is raised in relation to compulsory military service.  For analytical ease, it is with the 
circumstance of compulsory military service that this paper will be concerned.4
 
By way of background, compulsory military service is practiced in about 100 countries; conscription exists 
as a reality in a majority of the member states of the United Nations and for an overwhelming majority of the 
population of the world.5  Compulsory military service has been both denounced as nothing less than the 
surrender of “the most essential rights of personal liberty”6 and praised as the sine qua non of full 
citizenship.7  Despite a debate that continues to this date concerning its legitimacy, compulsory military 
service is a continuing phenomenon that affects the lives of many millions of men around the world.8
 
Many of the countries requiring military service are a significant source of refugees.  Of the top ten source 
countries for refugees in 2002 at least eight require military service.9  It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
topic of compulsory military service, and in particular the issue of the status of military service evaders, has 
been raised in refugee determination proceedings.10  It will be the purpose of this paper to assess the 
treatment of evaders of compulsory military service in the Canadian refugee jurisprudence.   3
TIT 
The underlying premise of this paper is that the refugee 
jurisprudence concerning military service evasion has been, 
up to the present, plagued by fragmentation, incoherence and 
inattention.   
As contrasted with refugee law in general, the 
jurisprudence on military service evasion is 
parochial and makes very limited use of extra-
jurisdictional refugee jurisprudence on the topic, 
municipal jurisprudence on military service evasion 
or international human rights jurisprudence.11  These 
jurisprudential deficits have been accompanied by a 
lack of legislative and administrative attention to the 
subject. 
  
Notwithstanding the premise of this paper, it will be 
suggested that the deficits in the refugee 
jurisprudence are not without remedy.  A coherent 
approach to military service evasion which draws 
upon extra-jurisdictional refugee jurisprudence, 
municipal experience of conscription and 
international human rights jurisprudence can yet be 
formulated.  It is the project of this paper to attempt 
to establish a framework of analysis within which 
the jurisprudence can be organized and understood.  
However, it must be noted at the outset that such an 
approach to the status of military service evaders in 
refugee law, in particular, cannot succeed without 
recognition of the underlying debate about the 
legitimacy of military service raised by the topic of 
military service evasion in general.   
 
This paper will be divided into three parts.  Firstly, 
the framework of the definition of refugee will be 
outlined in the context of the Canadian statutory and 
jurisprudential framework, including the basic 
elements as relevant to the determination of claims 
involving military service evasion.  Secondly, the 
Canadian jurisprudence thus far on the ability of 
military service evaders to gain refugee protection 
will be surveyed and organized.  Thirdly, some 
specific deficits of the Canadian jurisprudence to 
date will be discussed and suggestions will be made 
on how to bring the jurisprudence into line with 
various international human rights instruments and 
various municipal standards.  
However, before proceeding to an assessment of 
the jurisprudence, a few words should be said 
about the Canadian focus of this paper. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF CANADIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
This paper will only systematically consider the 
jurisprudence of Canada – although reference will 
be made to cases determined in other jurisdictions 
where appropriate, in particular the jurisprudence 
of the United States, Australia and the United 
Kingdom.  The focus on Canadian jurisprudence is 
coincidental, but not without significance.   
 
Coincidentally, it is the Canadian jurisprudence 
with which the author is most familiar and it was 
the Canadian jurisprudence that first brought the 
complexities of military service evasion to the 
attention of the author.  Furthermore, the working 
paper series of which this paper is a part is 
published by a Canadian centre and, in some 
measure, for a Canadian audience. 
 
However, there are also additional non-
coincidental reasons why the study of the 
Canadian jurisprudence is significant.  Canada 
possesses a well-developed judicial and 
administrative structure to determine refugee 
status on an individualized basis.12  Its refugee 
determination policies have been the subject of 
much praise; in particular, the Canadian approach 
to gender-based claims, civil-war situations and 
child refugee claimants have been recognized for 
their progressive nature.  Canadian jurisprudence 
has been widely quoted in the jurisprudence of 
other countries and in scholarly literature as a 
guiding light in the interpretation of the definition 
of refugee.13  Furthermore, the Canadian 
jurisprudence is largely in keeping with the 
international jurisprudence on many issues raised 
by military service evasion.   
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Also, the Canadian jurisprudence generally refers to 
international jurisprudence quite frequently – thus it 
would appear to provide a useful indicator of 
emerging issues in the international military service 
evasion jurisprudence.   
 
For all of these reasons, the present paper explores 
the Canadian jurisprudence on military service 
evasion.  It is hoped that the present paper will 
establish a benchmark which can be used to assess 
the jurisprudence of other countries.  In this respect, 
the present paper is an arbitrary starting point in the 
larger project of assessing the common-law refugee 
jurisprudence on military service evasion, including 
in addition to Canada, the jurisprudence of 
Australia, the United Kingdom and the USA. 
 
One final word should be said about the focus of the 
paper on the Canadian jurisprudence.  As the earlier 
comments on the case of Mr. Hinzman suggest, the 
Canadian jurisprudence on military service evasion 
is in the midst of a fairly active period of 
development.  As such, it should be noted that this 
paper represents the current state of the 
jurisprudence.  It is anticipated that the Federal 
Court of Appeal, and possibly the Supreme Court of 
Canada, will weighing in on Mr. Hinzman’s refugee 
claim.  Obviously, these future judicial 
pronouncements may significantly affect the 
direction of the jurisprudence with respect to 
military service evasion.14
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN 
REFUGEE FRAMEWORK AS IT RELATES 
TO MILITARY SERVICE EVADERS 
  
The sequence of determination and appeal in Canada 
in relation to refugee matters is as follows: a 
determination by the Refugee Protection Division of 
the Immigration and Refugee Board (the “Board”);15 
an application for leave and for judicial review to 
the Federal Court of Canada (formerly, the Trial 
Division of the Federal Court); an appeal to the 
Federal Court of Appeal (formerly the Appeal 
Division of the Federal Court); and, an appeal to the  
Supreme Court of Canada.16  Not surprisingly the 
bulk of the jurisprudence on military service 
evasion comes from the Board and the Federal 
Court.17  While details of the Canadian refugee 
determination system have been altered recently 
through new immigration legislation, the core 
statutory definition of “refugee” in Canadian law 
remains unchanged.18
 
One of the stated goals of the refugee 
determination process is “to fulfil Canada's 
international legal obligations with respect to 
refugees”19  To this end, Canada essentially uses 
the definition of refugee found in Article 1(A) of 
the 1951 Convention: 
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 A Convention refugee is a person 
who, by reason of a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political 
opinion who (a) is outside each of 
their countries of nationality and is 
unable or, by reason of that fear, 
unwilling to avail themself of the 
protection of each of those countries; 
or (b) not having a country of 
nationality, is outside the country of 
their former habitual residence and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, 
unwilling to return to that country.”20definition of refugee can be broken down, for 
urpose of the present discussion, into three 
ponents: (a) the requirement of a well-founded 
of being persecuted; (b) the requirement that 
ersecution in question be for one of the five 
cribed reasons; and, (c) the requirement that a 
ant’s government be unable or unwilling to 
 protection.  The interpretation of each of 
 requirements in the Canadian jurisprudence 
ey relate to military service evasion will be 
ly discussed in sequence. 
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 A.  REQUIREMENT OF PERSECUTION 
 
The definition of refugee does not define what it 
means to have a “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted”.  Drawing upon scholarly analysis, the 
jurisprudence has come to define “persecution” as a 
key denial of a core human right.  As stated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, “[t]he essential question 
is whether the persecution alleged by the claimant 
threatens his or her basic human rights in a 
fundamental way.”21  Reference is made in the 
Canadian jurisprudence to both internationally and 
municipally defined human rights.22  While 
repetition and persistence are frequently 
characteristics of persecution, a serious violation of 
an individual’s human rights need not be repeated in 
order to constitute persecution.23  However, by all 
accounts, not just any violation of an individual’s 
human rights will constitute persecution; only 
serious violations of an individual’s human rights 
will qualify.  At issue with the issue of military 
service evasion is not only whether forced military 
service per se constitutes a denial of a core human 
right but also whether the punishment that is meted 
out to an individual who evades compulsory military 
service is severe enough to amount to persecution.   
 
B. REQUIREMENT OF NEXUS 
 
However, not all claimants who are at risk of 
persecution are considered by law to be refugees. 
Only those claimants whose risk arises “for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion”24  The 
requirement that persecution occur “for reasons of” 
one of the five enumerated grounds is often referred 
to as the requirement of “nexus”.   
 
The Canadian jurisprudence generally interprets 
nexus quite broadly.  Mixed motives or perceptions 
do not preclude a nexus, as long as some motives or 
perceptions are tied to an enumerated ground.25  
Ultimately, it is the perception of the agent of 
persecution, which may or may not conform with 
reality, that is the most important aspect of the 
analysis.26   
However, in cases of military service evasion, the 
motivation of the claimant may also be considered.  
In the Canadian jurisprudence, neutrality may be a 
political opinion.27
 
Unlike the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions, 
particularly the American jurisprudence, the 
Canadian jurisprudence does not spend much time 
on the technicalities of nexus.28
 
Although related to the requirement of a well-
founded fear of persecution insofar as it links the 
fear to an enumerated reason, the requirement of 
nexus is an independent and necessary condition for 
a successful refugee claim.  While in some cases, a 
nexus may be a component of persecution (as in the 
case where a finding of an “arbitrary arrest” may 
require proof of an improper motive for the arrest), it 
is not a condition precedent for a finding of 
persecution.  Notwithstanding this statement, some 
of the jurisprudence continues to link persecution 
and nexus.29  As will be seen in the assessment of 
the jurisprudence, the undue linkage of persecution 
and nexus plagues, inter alia, the military service 
evasion jurisprudence. 
 
Political opinion and religion are often cited grounds 
of nexus in military service evasion cases.  While a 
few military service evasion cases also make use of 
membership in a particular social group this is a 
decidedly underdeveloped part of the 
jurisprudence.30  In addition, it has yet to become 
apparent whether the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the Board to include “persons in need of protection” 
(who do not require a nexus) will significantly affect 
the military service evasion jurisprudence.31
 
C. REQUIREMENT OF AN INABILITY OF THE 
STATE TO OFFER PROTECTION 
 
State protection is seldom explicitly discussed in the 
context of military service evasion.  However, it is 
an important concept to remember in assessing the 
claims of military service evaders.   
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“There is a vast Canadian refugee jurisprudence on military service 
evasion […] Unfortunately, despite the significant body of 
jurisprudence, there has been very little, if any, scholarly analysis of 
military service evasion jurisprudence.” The latter half of the Canadian statutory definition of refugee addresses the need for a failure of state 
protection: a refugee must be “unable or, by reason of [his] fear, unwilling to avail [himself] of the 
protection of [his country of nationality].”32
 
Generally, there is a presumption that a state can protect its citizens.  In order to rebut this presumption, a 
claimant must present “clear and convincing evidence” of a state’s inability to offer protection.33  Such 
evidence can include evidence of the state’s past failure to offer protection to the claimant or the state’s 
failure to offer protection to similarly situated individuals.  However, notwithstanding a state’s obligation to 
provide protection, there is neither an obligation nor an expectation that the state can offer perfect protection. 
 
The requirement of state protection is seldom dealt with explicitly in the military service evasion 
jurisprudence.  Yet state protection is an important consideration in many military service evasion cases.  To 
take but two of the most obvious examples, claims based upon fear of conscription by guerillas and claims 
based upon the availability (or lack thereof) of alternate military service for conscientious objectors both 
require a careful analysis of the steps taken by the state in question to protect the claimants in question from 
persecution.  In a broader sense, the issue of state protection in a broader sense, lies at the heart of military 
service evasion and the underlying issue of compulsory military service: how should the state reconcile its 
competing obligations to itself and its citizenry? 
 
As will be seen in the assessment of the Canadian jurisprudence, the issue of state protection has been dealt 
with all too inadequately.34  The case-law more often deals with state protection implicitly; there have been 
all too few explicit incorporations of the requirement of the state’s inability to offer protection into the 
determinations of the case-law. 
III. SURVEY OF CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE35
 
There is a vast Canadian refugee jurisprudence on military service evasion.36 Although it is difficult to 
generalize, the most significant countries of origin for military service evaders as reported in the 
jurisprudence are, in no particular order, Israel, Russia, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the significant body of jurisprudence, there has been very little, if any, scholarly 
analysis of military service evasion jurisprudence.37  Hathaway’s brief, and now quite dated, comments on 
military service evasion provide the only scholarly guidance regularly quoted by the jurisprudence.38 Indeed, 
the jurisprudence as a whole has not been systematically analyzed by even the judiciary itself since the Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Zolfagharkhani.  Unfortunately, the jurisprudence frequently displays this lack of 
attention while acknowledging it all too infrequently.39
 
In organizing the cases, it is useful to categorize based upon the underlying nature of the claim: whether the 
fear of military service itself is the basis of claim or whether an ancillary aspect of military service is the 
basis of the claim.  An intermediate category of claims based upon what is conventionally labelled as 
“conscientious objection” will also be canvassed.  Each of these categories will be dealt with in sequence.407
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While such per se persecution would normally 
nonetheless require a nexus to the enumerated 
grounds of the 1951 Convention, it would appear, as 
discussed further below, that some of the 
jurisprudence considers these categories of 
prohibited compulsory military service to have an 
automatic nexus to political opinion.  The 
terminology used by the jurisprudence embodies the 
idea of an implicit nexus (albeit as much to religion 
as to political opinion): “selective conscientious 
objector”.46  
 
The automatically prohibited forms of compulsory 
military service can be categorized according to the 
source of the prohibition: military service prohibited 
due to the nature of the conscripted action; military 
service prohibited due to the nature of the 
conscriptor; and, military service prohibited due to 
the fundamental nature of the conscriptee.  Each of 
these categories of prohibited military service will 
be discussed in sequence below.  
i. COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE 
PROHIBITED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE 
MILITARY ACTION 
 
Firstly, some forms of compulsory military service 
are prohibited due to the nature of the military action 
that the conscript will be required to perform.  The 
most clear example of excluded military service is 
military service where the conscript will be forced to 
perform an act which is “condemned by the 
international legal community as contrary to basic 
rules of human conduct”.47  
 
This category clearly includes participation in 
military actions in violation of established 
international law, including the use of chemical 
weapons and the widespread commission of 
“atrocities”. 48  Some jurisprudence also holds that 
this category includes participation in a war of 
aggression explicitly condemned by the Security 
Council – although we shall see that this proposition 
has recently been criticized.49  However, this 
category may also include actions not necessarily in 
violation of international law but otherwise  
“condemned” by the international community, 
including the commission of “reprehensible acts 
against one’s countrymen”50 and the senseless 
perpetuation of a civil war.51   
  
A. REFUGEE CLAIMS BASED UPON 
PROHIBITED FORMS OF MILITARY 
SERVICE 
s often been said that compulsory military 
ice per se cannot provide the basis for a 
essful refugee claim.  I do not believe this to be 
rely true.  Compulsory military service may per 
rovide a basis of claim where the military 
ice in question is in some way a prohibited form 
ompulsory military service.   
rning to the root of “persecution” in 
rnational human rights law, according to the 
PR, no person “shall be required to perform 
ed or compulsory labour”.41  However, the 
PR grants an exemption from the prohibition for 
ny service of a military character”.42 Therefore, 
efinition, any military service that does not fall 
in the exception is a violation of a claimant’s 
t to be free of forced labour – and can 
equently be viewed as potentially persecutory.   
le the brief wording of the exception for “any 
ice of a military character” can be seen as fairly 
d, in fact the refugee jurisprudence has 
rpreted it fairly restrictively.   
sequently, there are several categories of prima 
e “service of a military character” that will be 
d to be improper.  Forced performance of such 
tary service automatically constitutes 
ecution.43  In other words, performance of such 
tary service would be persecutory even if the 
ant performed such service or had no particular
ction to such service.44   
 persecutory nature of such conscription lies in 
asic illegal character and is independent of the 
ant’s actions and motives: 
We are all of the view that the Board erred 
when it concluded that the appellant’s fear 
was of “prosecution” rather than 
“persecution”.  Simply stated, the refusal to 
carry out military orders, which have no legal 
foundation, cannot give rise to a fear of 
prosecution – which implies one is dealing 
with a valid law of general application.  
Rather, such inaction on the part of the 
appellant could well be regarded as giving 
rise to persecution . . .458
  Regardless of whether the “personal association” 
requirement in Hinzman is adopted, it is already 
fairly clear that the “normal” sporadic occurrence of 
prohibited actions in war, unrelated to the claimant, 
will not render the military service prohibited.56  
Some of the jurisprudence requires a claimant to 
establish that the state condones the illicit military 
activity in question.57  The jurisprudence on 
complicity (arising out of the application of the 
exclusion clauses) would presumably apply to this 
determination: only if the claimant would be 
complicit in prohibited military actions would the 
compulsion of his military service be prohibited.58  
However, the jurisprudence has thus far made no 
explicit linkage of the prohibition of this type of 
military service to complicity in the actions in 
question.  The implications of linking this type of 
prohibited military service with the notion of 
complicity will be discussed below at length. 
 
The Canadian jurisprudence invites the application 
of the doctrine of complicity to this category of 
prohibited military service since the jurisprudence 
itself frequently cites the need to avoid forced 
complicity as the policy rationale for finding this 
category of military service to be prohibited.  
However, the law on complicity is not very helpful 
to a claimant fearing prohibited military service.  
Historically, complicity will generally not be 
attributed to those “who were drafted by the State 
for membership”59  While mere membership in an 
organization may sometimes render an individual 
complicit, this should be seen as an exception and 
does not generally apply to a conscript in the 
conscripted armed forces of a state.60  The facts of 
Zolfarghani have been interpreted as requiring 
“reasons of an extremely serious nature” in order for 
a finding of prohibited military service.61  This is not 
to say that this condition can never be satisfied; 
given the horrific actions of many militaries around 
the world the unfortunate reality is that service in 
many militaries may qualify. 62
 
The law governing complicity differentiates between 
“continuous and regular” acts and “isolated 
incidents.”63  In both cases, complicity will occur 
only through “personal and knowing participation” 
in the acts in question.  However, in the former case  
 
 Arguably the leading case on military service 
evasion, Zolfarghkahni, falls into this later type of  
condemned but not necessarily illegal actions.52
 
It is unclear whether evidence must establish that the 
claimant will personally be party to the performance 
of such prohibited military service or simply that the 
military in question generally performs such 
prohibited actions.53  The Board’s recent ruling in 
the matter of Hinzman certainly suggests that a close 
personal connection akin to complicity in the 
prohibited actions will be required.  In the Hinzman 
matter the Board quoted Lord Justice Potter of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) in Krotov v. Secretary Of State for the 
Home Department54:  
 
It was the view of Lord Justice Potter that the 
crimes listed, if committed on a systemic basis as 
an aspect of deliberate policy, or as a result of 
official indifference to the widespread actions of 
a brutal military, qualify as acts contrary to the 
basic rules of human conduct in respect of which 
punishment for a refusal to participate will 
constitute persecution within the ambit of the 
1951 Convention.  His second observation in 
respect of the test, propounded in B v. SSHD, is 
that he would substitute the words "in which he 
may be required to participate" for the words 
"with which he may be associated" as 
emphasizing that the grounds should be limited to 
reasonable fear on the part of the objector that he 
will be personally involved in such acts, as 
opposed to a more generalized assertion of fear or 
opinion based on reported examples of individual 
excesses of the kind that almost inevitably occur 
in the course of armed conflict, but which are not 
such as to amount to the multiple commission of 
inhumane acts pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
state policy of authorization or indifference.55    
 
The ruling in Hinzman continues a line of the 
jurisprudence suggesting that a degree of complicity 
in the actions which underlie the prohibited nature of 
the conflict will be required in order to render 
conscription into such a conflict improper.  The 
nature of the underlying actions, the degree of 
complicity required, and a critique of the use of the 
concept of complicity (or, in the phrasing of 
Hinzman, personal association) will provide the 
outline for the remainder of the discussion of 
conscription into a prohibited military action. 
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 of widespread prohibited actions, such participation will be inferred from mere membership in the 
organization: 
 
As I understand the jurisprudence, it is that a person who is a member of the persecuting group and who 
has knowledge that activities are being committed by the group and who neither takes steps to prevent 
them occurring (if he has the power to do so) nor disengages himself from the group at the earliest 
opportunity (consistent with safety for himself) but who lends his active support to the group will be 
considered to be an accomplice. A shared common purpose will be considered to exist.64
 
However, applying the doctrine of complicity to the determination of when conscription into the military is 
prohibited is not without problems.  The test for complicity has been developed in exclusion jurisprudence – 
a jurisprudence which is generally favorable to the claimant given the gravity of excluding an individual who 
would otherwise be offered protection as a refugee.  However, in applying the complicity test to a category 
of prohibited military service, the test is being moved from the determination of exclusion to the 
determination of inclusion.  The sympathy to the claimant which is appropriate for exclusion is less 
appropriate for inclusion.  It is possible that a claimant who deserts midway through a conflict could be 
found not complicit for the purposes of exclusion but nonetheless complicit for the purposes of inclusion 
through a prohibited form of compulsory military service.65  In addition, some of the prohibited acts in 
question are acts in which it is very difficult to have personal complicity.  For example, with respect to types 
of actions “condemned by the international legal community”, it is analytically difficult to apply the doctrine 
of complicity to conscripts engaged in the waging of a “non-defensive incursion into foreign territory”.66
 
Nonetheless, complicity is a useful concept when evaluating a claim of persecution based upon conscription 
into a prohibited military action.  However, returning to the view that the forced performance of a prohibited 
category of military service is per se persecutory, it would be useful to apply the tool of state protection in 
conjunction with complicity rather than relying solely upon that of complicity.  As noted previously, state 
protection need not be perfect.  Thus, where a state does not condone or facilitate the prohibited actions and 
there is an established mechanism for preventing, reporting and punishing the commission of prohibited acts, 
it would appear very difficult to establish a risk of prohibited military service due to the nature of military 
action.  In order to succeed, in such a situation, a claimant would have to present, in the language of Ward, 
“clear and compelling evidence” of the state’s inability to prevent the claimant from becoming complicit in 
such prohibited actions. 
 
However, in situations where the state condones, encourages or acquiesces in the prohibited actions, the 
presumption of state protection is automatically rebutted due to the nature of the persecutor: the state itself.  
In such a case, the claimant would merely have to establish that there is a serious possibility of becoming 
complicit in such prohibited actions in order to render his compulsory military service prohibited.   
 
Needless to say, the difference between the first and second categories of situations is one of degree rather 
than category.  In all cases, a determination of complicity must be performed in a pragmatic manner67 - in 
other words such a determination should give the benefit of any doubt to the claimant. 
 
There is also some suggestion that any punishment for refusal to participate in this type of prohibited 
military service will constitute persecution.68  However, a more conventional approach would be to consider 
whether the punishment in question is a serious violation of the claimant’s human rights.  Given the context 
of punishment for failing to comply with prohibited conscription – the punishment of an essentially 
“innocent” man for failing to comply with an illegal act – it is likely that anything more than brief 
imprisonment would constitute persecution.  In any case, this issue is usually moot as punishment for failure 
to comply with prohibited conscription usually also includes renewed forced enrollment in the military. 10
 This line of cases finds support in the remarks of 
Goodwin-Gill.73  However, this line of cases is 
likely to come under increasing challenge in the 
future.74  Furthermore, insofar as the Canadian 
jurisprudence interprets all enumerated grounds 
fairly broadly, the lack of an implicit political 
opinion is not necessarily fatal to such claims.75
ii. COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE 
PROHIBITED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE 
CONSCRIPTOR 
 
Secondly, there is some Canadian jurisprudence to 
suggest that some forms of military service are 
prohibited due to the nature of the conscriptor.76  
Recalling my previous remarks regarding the human 
rights framework governing military service, 
compulsory military service is allowed as an 
exception to the prohibition of forced labour and 
servitude only when required by a government.  In 
keeping with this framework, the jurisprudence 
generally holds that while national governments may 
have a prima facie right to conscript individuals 
within their territory, such a right does not extend to 
non-state actors.77  However, the Canadian 
jurisprudence is far from unanimous on this topic.78  
It is the non-state nature of the conscriptor that leads 
to the prohibition of their conscription; 
notwithstanding the prohibited nature of the 
conscriptor, the internationally condemned nature of 
the military action in which it is engaged may also 
result in the prohibition of conscription.79   
 
With respect to conscriptors, the jurisprudence 
provides no guidance on how to determine whether a 
particular conscriptor is legitimate – whether it can 
be considered as a “state” conscriptor.  As of the 
present time, the jurisprudence in support of this 
prohibition has involved conscription by groups that 
are clearly not recognized governments: the South 
Lebanese Army, the LTTE guerillas of Sri Lanka, 
and the Colombian FARC rebels.  The jurisprudence 
regarding groups of more ambiguous status is 
decidedly mixed.80  There is also some jurisprudence 
to suggest that even military service compelled by 
national governments will not be considered “state” 
conscription if the government is acting outside of 
its municipal legislative or executive framework.81  
Under this approach, “impressment” would 
constitute per se persecution.   
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As for nexus, as noted at the outset of this 
discussion, the jurisprudence often reads political 
opinion into evasion of prohibited forms of 
compulsory military service.  This most often 
happens through the assumption that the state would 
impute a political opinion to an opponent of such 
prohibited military service.  Such was the case in 
Zolfgharkhani: 
 
There can be no doubt that the appellant's 
refusal to participate in the military action 
against the Kurds would be treated by the 
Iranian government as the expression of an 
unacceptable political opinion.69
 
This direct equation of refusal to perform prohibited 
military service and a nexus to political opinion has 
been repeated in subsequent jurisprudence.70  Such 
an imputation is logical given the desperate 
circumstances – and heightened political passions - 
which produce prohibited conscription; such an 
environment fosters a “your either with us or against
us” mentality. However, some of the jurisprudence 
also suggests that any opposition to a prohibited 
form of military service will be in some way 
inherently political.  Even Zolfagharkhani at times 
suggests this possibility: 
 
The probable use of chemical weapons, 
which the Board accepts as a fact, is clearly 
judged by the international community to be 
contrary to basic rules of human conduct, and 
consequently the ordinary Iranian 
conscription law of general application, as 
applied to a conflict in which Iran intended to 
use chemical weapons, amounts to 
persecution for political opinion.71
 
The linkage between prohibited military service and 
political opinion in the jurisprudence can be traced 
back to the Ciric decision of the Federal Court Trial 
Division whereby the refusal of a Serbian couple to 
be conscripted into their country’s horrific civil war 
was found to be an inherently political act: 
 
Accordingly the issue before the panel in 
Ciric was whether there was evidence of the 
conflict being "condemned by the 
international community as contrary to basic 
rules of human conduct" as set out in 
paragraph 171 of the UNHCR Handbook. On 
this basis, the refusal to serve in Ciric was an 
expression of political opinion and the 
conscription law was viewed not as a law of 
general application but a law of persecutory 
effect.72
Surprisingly, the jurisprudence on this topic makes 
no reference to the recent developments on the topic 
in international law nor to the plethora of 
international research, instruments and resolutions 
on this topic.86  Although seldom explicitly stated, 
the nexus in the case of child soldiers is their 
membership in a particular social group.  
 
Conscientious objectors can also be seen as a 
subtype of individuals whose compelled military 
service is prohibited due to the nature of the 
conscriptee.  In the case of a conscientious objector, 
the prohibition arises out of the beliefs of the 
conscriptee.  However, unlike child soldiers, the 
beliefs of the conscientious objector are not inherent 
and immutable.  For this reason, and the more 
practical reason that the jurisprudence deals with 
conscientious objectors as a separate type of military 
service evader, conscientious objectors to military 
service will be dealt with separately.  For similar 
reasons, those individuals who face the targeted 
enforcement of conscription due to, inter alia, their 
political opinions or religious beliefs will be dealt 
with separately.87  
 
It is not completely clear whether the prohibition of 
the conscription of children relates to their special 
status in law as children or simply to particular 
international instruments prohibiting their 
conscription.  The aforementioned lack of reference 
to international law in the jurisprudence on 
conscription of children suggests the latter.  If this is 
indeed the case, the prohibition may also be 
extended to include other special groups identified 
in international law, including the mentally and 
physically disabled88; indigenous peoples; and the 
elderly.   
 
There is some support in international law for 
prohibiting the conscription of mentally and 
physically disabled individuals.89  Of course, for 
practical reasons of military efficiency, the disabled 
are highly unlikely to be the focus of military 
recruitment efforts.  The situation with respect to 
indigenous peoples is more ambiguous.  While 
international law requires that “special measures” be 
taken to ensure governmental actions “[safeguard] 
the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures 
and environment of the peoples concerned,”90 
international law also allows for “compulsory 
personal services”, presumably such as compulsory  
“On the facts, most non-state  
conscriptors view individuals  
who do not agree to be conscripted  
as political opponents.” 
 
 The comments made with respect to nexus for 
military service prohibited by the nature of the 
action also apply to the present situation.  However, 
as noted previously, membership in a particular 
social group is also commonly cited in the 
jurisprudence for this category of prohibited 
conscription.82  Furthermore, the Canadian 
jurisprudence, as noted in the initial discussion of 
nexus, allows “neutrality” to provide a nexus to 
political opinion.83 On the facts, most non-state 
conscriptors view individuals who do not agree to be 
conscripted as political opponents.   
 
Punishment for resisting this type of conscription is 
almost never an issue as the nature of the conscriptor 
renders all punishment extrajudicial.  Generally, on 
the facts, “punishment” for resisting conscription 
consists either of death or enforced conscription 
under even more unfavorable conditions.    
iii. COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE 
PROHIBITED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE 
CONSCRIPT 
 
Thirdly, some forms of military service are 
prohibited due to the nature of the individual being 
targeted for conscription.84  The only category of 
individuals who have thus far been clearly identified 
in the jurisprudence as absolutely prohibited from 
being conscripted are children.  The conscription of 
children constitutes per se persecution: 
 
I believe that there is a reasonable chance the 
younger claimant [17 years of age] would be 
forcibly recruited by either the military or the 
guerillas and hence there is a reasonable 
chance that he would face persecution if he 
returns to his country of nationality.  Thus I 
am satisfied that this claimant’s fear of 
persecution in his country of nationality is 
well-founded by reason of his membership in 
a particular social group, namely, Salvadoran 
minors who are at risk of forcible and 
unlawful recruitment.85
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Notwithstanding the controversy, the Canadian 
jurisprudence quietly assumes – but also heavily 
restricts – the right to conscientiously object to 
military service. 97
 
The first mention of conscientious objection in the 
refugee case-law is a good illustration of this 
approach.  In its decision in Musial the Court of 
Appeal both implicitly recognizes conscientious 
objection as a valid ground of refugee protection and 
rejects the claimant’s attempts to bring himself 
within the narrow limits of the term: 
 
While the Board's reasons, which were dated 
some three weeks after the decision was 
pronounced, are perhaps ineptly expressed 
and give the impression that in the Board's 
view army deserters and conscientious 
objectors do not fall within the definition, I 
do not read the reasons as meaning anything 
more than that army deserters and 
conscientious objectors are not, as such, 
within the definition.  That is, as I see it, far 
from saying that because a person is an army 
deserter or a conscientious objector he cannot 
be a Convention refugee and I do not think 
the Board has made any such ruling.  What military service where it is required of the citizenry 
in general.. . .  in cases prescribed by law for all 
citizens”. 91 Furthermore, notwithstanding a large 
number of cases involving the conscription of 
indigenous individuals, no mention has been made 
in the jurisprudence of indigenous status as a ground 
of prohibition of conscription.92  With respect to the 
elderly, the situation is analogous to that of the 
disabled: there is some support for the prohibition of 
conscription of the elderly, 93 but military efficiency 
suggests that it is unlikely to occur in any case.94
B. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 
 
Notwithstanding the state’s general right to compel 
an individual to perform military service, there is a 
category of individuals who may not be compelled 
to perform such service.  These individuals are 
known in the jurisprudence as “conscientious 
objectors” – although the term and its usage is 
fraught with inconsistency.  The term conscientious 
objector in this section will be used to refer to the 
subset of military service evaders who articulate 
their evasion of military service in terms of their 
underlying political and religious views.95
 the Board appears to me to have done is to point out that army deserters and 
conscientious objectors are not dealt with as 
such by the definition and then to go on to 
consider the applicant's case on its merits, 
including the applicant's motives, and to 
conclude that in the case before it, the 
applicant's objection to serving in 
Afghanistan, if called upon to do so, was not 
sufficient to differentiate his case from the 
case of any other draft evader and thus to 
form its opinion that there were not 
reasonable grounds to believe that the 
applicant's claim for Convention refugee 
status could be established.98
 
The significance, and drawbacks, of this quiet 
assumption of a right to conscientious objection will 
be discussed further in the analysis.   
The ability of an individual, 
including a refugee, to claim 
conscientor objector status is the 
subject of much debate in the 
scholarly literature, in 
international law and in the 
jurisprudence of other 
jurisdictions.96   
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 i. DEFINITION OF “CONSCIENCE” AND “OBJECTION” 
 
According to the Canadian jurisprudence, the right to conscientious objection requires a deep seated ethical or 
religious objection to all forms of military service: 
 
The panel begins its assessment of the claimant's assertion that he is a conscientious objector 
in need of protection with a few general observations about the panel's understanding of what 
is meant by the term "conscientious objection".  "Conscience", in the panel's opinion, refers to 
a person's genuine convictions which spring from one's political opinion, religious beliefs or 
philosophical tenets.99
 
Although not directly addressed in the jurisprudence, atheism may preclude conscientious objection.100
 
With respect to the meaning of “objection”, the jurisprudence suggests that it must total.  The right to 
conscientious objection exists only in absolute form; a “partial” conscientious objection will not bring a 
claimant protection.  As noted previously, while the case-law makes mention of “partial objection”, this label 
is applied not to situations where the claimant believes the particular war is against his conscience but rather to 
situations where the military action is “condemned by the international community.” 101  In other words, 
“partial conscientious objection” has been removed from the realm of conscience and placed into the realm of 
an objective assessment of the validity of military action. 
 
The conscientious objection must have an extra-personal foundation; fear of death or combat is insufficient to 
found a claim of conscientious objection.102  However, oddly, despite the preclusion of conscientious objection 
based upon fear of death during service, fear of death while on leave or otherwise hors de combat may allow a 
successful refugee claim: 
 
He also fears persecution in Algeria at the hands of armed Islamic extremists who have 
particularly targeted university educators with death and are still capable of carrying out such 
threats.  They had also targeted persons responding to conscription with death.  He believed 
that his only option was to leave the country and abandon his family and his university 
employment in order to avoid both groups.103
 
Ultimately, the distinction between in-service and out-of-service risk is a legalistic distinction; for a claimant, 
both types of risk of death are equally daunting.  The only way it can be understood is through the unstated 
presumption that while armed and performing service a conscript is receiving as much state protection as 
theoretically possible whereas while unarmed the conscript is receiving (on the facts in Algeria, or other 
countries in similar situations) inadequate state protection.   However this reasoning presupposes that risk of 
death while in military service would constitute persecution – a supposition that the jurisprudence has, to date, 
vehemently rejected.  The reasoning in the above-quoted claim and similar claims is perhaps the closest that 
the Canadian jurisprudence has come to consistently understanding those targeted for conscription as a 
particular social group. 
 
Since conscientious objection is an objection to military service it exists only where there is no alternate 
civilian service available for conscientious objectors: “[i]f and when available, as here, alternative compulsory 
military service also does not a Convention refugee make”.104  Often, the Board has required the claimant to 
avail himself of alternate service before seeking protection as a refugee – although this can also be seen as a 
test of the claimant’s credibility and subjective fear.105  More will be said about the topic of alternate service 
below. 
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Ironically, it is often as a result of prior experience 
in the military that conscientious objectors form 
their objections.113
 
An exclusion from basing a claim on compulsory 
military service when the compulsion was self-
inflicted makes sense as an evidentiary presumption.  
The deliberate infliction of compulsory military 
service may indicate a subjective agreement with 
such service incompatible with the subjective fear 
required for a successful refugee claim.  Such a 
presumption is consistent with the similar 
presumption that an individual who has previously 
performed compulsory military service has no 
subjective fear of such service.114  However, while a 
logical presumption, such an exclusion makes no 
sense as a legal principle.  Unlike matters of equity, 
there is no requirement that a claimant come before 
the Board with “clean hands”.115
 
Unfortunately, this emerging exclusion is similar to 
the Canadian jurisprudence on sur place refugee 
claims based upon actions which knowingly create a 
risk of persecution.116  However, there remains hope 
that the exclusion of individuals who knowingly 
inflict compulsory military service upon themselves 
will become simply an evidentiary presumption.117  
It is unclear whether this emerging prohibition of 
claims based upon military service evasion applies 
to claims based upon prohibited forms of military 
service.118  Policy grounds alone would suggest that 
any exclusion should not be extended to include 
those claims.   
 
Other past actions which are assessed to determine 
the credibility of a claimant’s conscientious 
objection include the degree to which the claimant 
actively seeks to avoid compelled military 
service,119 the degree to which the claimant complies 
with directives to perform military service.120
 
iii. DENIAL OF CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTION AMOUNTING TO 
PERSECUTION 
 
The breach of the right to conscientious objection 
gives rise to refugee status only where the breach is 
serious enough to amount to persecution.   
  
ii. PROOF OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
 
In practice, it is necessarily difficult to assess the 
truth of a claimant’s statement of conscience. 
Consequently, the Canadian jurisprudence has 
developed a process of assessment based largely 
upon (i) a claimant’s ability to articulate his 
objection, and (ii) his past actions.   With respect to 
the former, the claimant’s articulation of his beliefs, 
any articulation of conscience will be assessed for 
coherence and detail: 
 
The claimant testified that his religious 
beliefs preclude military service, but when 
asked (several times) to be specific about 
this, the claimant was hesitant in the extreme 
and was only able to offer rather vague 
generalities.  Such being the case, we do not 
believe that the claimant has any genuine 
religious convictions that preclude military 
service.106     
 
Notwithstanding the general importance of the 
articulation of his beliefs, in some cases, usually to 
the detriment of the claimant, this articulation is 
considered secondary to the tenets of the organized 
religion to which he belongs.107   
 
With respect to the latter, a claimant’s past actions, 
there is an emerging line of cases that suggest that 
an claimant whose past actions knowingly places 
himself in a situation where military service will be 
required cannot claim protection as a refugee on that 
basis.108  These cases largely emerge out of the 
usually unsuccessful refugee claims of emigrants to 
Israel from the former Soviet Republics.  Such 
claims inevitably cite prospective military service in 
Israel as a basis of claim.109  In one such case, the 
Court noted that migrants who freely immigrate to a 
country requiring military service cannot then claim 
persecution on that basis: 
 
As the Board clearly pointed out, and as the 
transcript shows, the applicants knew that 
there was compulsory military service in 
Israel and nonetheless decided to immigrate 
to that country.110
This exclusion would rationally also apply to both 
individuals who have previously served in the 
military111 and individuals who volunteer for 
military service and then, midway through their 
service, seek conscientious objector status.11215
 The breach normally takes the form of compelled 
service despite the conscientious objection or 
punishment for the conscientious objection must be 
serious enough as to amount to persecution.    With 
respect to compelled service, it would be logical that 
anything more than a minimal amount of compelled 
service would amount to persecution.  Such a rule 
would be in keeping with the rule that a prohibited 
form of military service is per se persecutory.  
However, the case-law has been much less eager to 
extend this proposition to conscientious objectors. 
 
With respect to punishment, imprisonment for seven 
to forty-five days in humane conditions does not 
amount to persecution.121  Nor does a small fine, re-
education and forced labour in addition to the 
compelled military service.122  An extension of 
service for three to six months is not persecutory.123 
An extension of punishment from 10 to 24 months is 
persecutory.124  Repeated prosecution for failing to 
perform compulsory military service may be 
persecutory.125  Were military service evaders are 
rarely prosecuted, the claimant will not be able to 
gain status as such.126  Imprisonment for up to ten 
years is persecutory.127
 
The recent decision from the bench by the Federal 
Court of Appeal in the matter of Ates serves to 
further cloud the issue.128  In that case, the Court of 
Appeal received the following certified question: 
 
In a country where military service is 
compulsory, and there is no alternative 
thereto, do repeated prosecutions and 
incarcerations of a conscientious objector for 
the offense of refusing to do his military 
service, constitute persecution based on a 
Convention refugee ground?129
 
Despite the almost tautological nature of the 
question, the Court of Appeal answered the question 
in the negative.130  One can only hope that the 
factual context of the case can serve to distinguish it.  
On the facts as found by the Board, Mr. Ates faced 
an unspecified (but implicitly not excessive) period 
of imprisonment at or exceeding international 
standards.131  If such a period of imprisonment were 
to be repeated, it would not necessarily constitute 
persecution.  Equally it would not necessarily not 
constitute persecution.  It is hoped that the Court of 
Appeal, in issuing its written decision, will take 
steps to limit it’s finding in this way. 
 
iv. STATE PROTECTION 
As always in refugee claims, the claimant must 
establish that his conscientious objections will not 
be recognized by the government of the country of 
reference.  This can be demonstrated by a previous 
decision to refuse him status as a conscientious 
objector or by the refusal of the government to grant 
conscientious objector status to other similarly 
situated individuals.132     
 
A claimant’s failure to seek conscientious objector 
status can be cited as a failure to establish that he 
would be denied such status: 
 
What is more, there is no evidence that the 
Applicant claimed exemption from military 
service in Israel on the ground that he was a 
conscientious objector and was refused 
exemption from military service.  One would 
not be surprised to find that there are in Israel 
alternative methods of service for individuals 
falling into that category.  But that aside, we 
simply do not know and as I have said there 
is no evidence that he objected to serving in 
the military as a conscientious objector when 
he was in Israel, so what disposition might be 
made by the Israeli government in such a 
case is not known.133
 
Such a failure to make enquiries about conscientious 
objector status may also indicate a lack of subjective 
fear by the claimant and bring into doubt the 
genuineness of his conscientious objection.134
C. REFUGEE CLAIMS BASED UPON 
ANCILLARY FEATURES OF MILITARY 
SERVICE 
 
The remainder of military service evaders fall into 
the general category of individuals facing prima 
facie legitimate conscription.  The determination of 
whether the purportedly legitimate conscription is 
legitimate in each particular case rests on the 
particular facts of the case. 
 
The framework of analysis that is applied is that 
derived from Zolfagharkani.  In arriving at its 
decision, the Court of Appeal enunciated four 
principles of analysis that have been taken up and 
frequently reiterated by the subsequent 
jurisprudence: 
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One seldom discussed feature of 
compulsory military service is the 
gendered nature of its object: the 
conscription of young males.139  
Despite the obviously male focus of 
conscription, the gender bias of 
conscription is seldom raised as a 
discriminatory basis for 
recruitment.140 17 
(1) The statutory definition of 
Convention refugee makes the intent (or 
any principal effect) of an ordinary law 
of general application, rather than the 
motivation of the claimant, relevant to 
the existence of persecution. 
 
(2) But the neutrality of an ordinary law 
of general application, vis-a-vis the five 
grounds for refugee status, must be 
judged objectively by Canadian tribunals 
and courts when required. 
 
(3) In such consideration, an ordinary 
law of general application, even in non-
democratic societies, should, I believe, be 
given a presumption of validity and 
neutrality, and the onus should be on a 
claimant, as is generally the case in 
refugee cases, to show that the laws are 
either inherently or for some other reason 
persecutory. 
 
(4) It will not be enough for the claimant 
to show that a particular regime is 
generally oppressive but rather that the 
law in question is persecutory in relation 
to a Convention ground.135
th due respect to the Court of Appeal and to the 
sequent jurisprudence, these four principles do 
t significantly advance or explain the 
isprudence on compulsory military service.  In 
e regards, these principles are contradicted by 
 jurisprudence.  Certainly, conscientious 
jection is a good example of a law being judged 
proper because of effect rather than intent as 
gested by the first rule.  Fortunately, the 
isprudence, adheres to these principles more in 
ir quotation than in their application.  As 
icately noted in the Board’s own review of the 
isprudence applying the Zolfgaharkhani: “[t]he 
der should bear in mind these ambiguities in the 
e law when reviewing the following observations 
 reasons-of-conscience claims”.136
us, in approaching the issue of military service 
sion, the law requiring conscription (and 
nishing its avoidance or any subsequent desertion)
rima facie an ordinary law of general 
lication.  It is presumed, in the absence of 
dence to the contrary, to be neutral with respect  to the five enumerated grounds for refugee 
protection.  It is also assumed not to constitute 
persecution.  It is up to claimant to demonstrate, 
with respect to the law governing conscription or the
actions of the government with respect to 
conscription, that the law or the government will 
discriminate in its actions on the basis of one of the 
five enumerated grounds for refugee protection and 
will thereby place the claimant at risk of 
persecution.  Surprisingly, although not 
inappropriately, nexus is often the key variable in 
the determination of refugee claims based upon 
ancillary features of military service. 
 
The first step in the rebuttal of the presumption that 
compulsory military service is a law of general 
application is establishing some form of 
discriminatory mistreatment.  Logically, this 
mistreatment can occur before, during or after the 
compelled military service.  Each of these categories
of discriminatory mistreatment have been discussed 
in the jurisprudence and will be discussed in 
sequence. 
i. DISCRIMINATORY RECRUITMENT 
 
The temporally earliest form of discriminatory 
treatment that can occur is discrimination in 
recruitment.  Such discrimination has been found to 
occur where the “law of general application” in fact 
targets “non-natural” groups within the society for 
conscription.137  The targeting of rural and/or poor 
males for recruitment will constitute prohibited 
discrimination.138  Of course, where such 
discrimination is so severe as to constitute extralegal
forced recruitment, the analysis of “impressment” as 
a form of prohibited compelled military service 
would be more appropriate. 
 This is perhaps a consequence of the previously 
noted failure of the jurisprudence to consider 
membership in a particular social group as providing 
nexus.  Implicitly, military necessity is invoked to 
explain the military’s focus on men: women are 
physically unable to perform military service.  
However, given the increasing integration of men 
and women in volunteer-based militaries, the fatuity 
of the military necessity argument is becoming more 
and more obvious.   The case law usually implicitly 
adopts this argument through its refinement of the 
law of general application framework; 
 
In Syria, military service is compulsory for 
all males. In our opinion, this constitutes an 
ordinary law of general application.  Females 
are exempt, but this moans [sic] only that it is 
not an ordinary law of uniform application -- 
it remains an ordinary law of general 
application.141
 
Notwithstanding this general failure of the 
jurisprudence, there are some cases in which the 
putative nature of conscription as a “law of general 
application” is brought into question due to the 
particularly male nature of its focus.   
 
A reading of recent Australian jurisprudence 
suggests that this analysis while largely ignored in 
Canada has been adopted elsewhere.  There is also 
significant municipal jurisprudence on this topic 
arising from the USA’s Selective Service Act which 
applies to only men.  Unfortunately, the assessment 
of whether men suffering conscription constitute a 
particular social group is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  However, especially given the relative 
generosity of the Canadian interpretation of 
particular social group, it is a subject to which the 
jurisprudence ought to pay more attention. 
 
Discrimination during recruitment can also occur 
where certain categories of individuals are 
automatically provided with access to alternate 
service.  This occurs most frequently for women (in 
the state of Israel) and established religious groups 
(where the military service law enumerates members 
of certain religious groups as automatically being 
conscientious objectors).  However, as always, this 
discrimination must rise to the level of persecution 
in order to qualify the claimant for protection. 
 
ii. DISCRIMINATION DURING MILITARY 
SERVICE 
 
After enrollment in the military, discriminatory 
treatment can occur during actual military service.  
Such discrimination has been found to occur when a 
particular tribal group or gender is left unarmed and 
forced to perform menial tasks.142  Similarly, 
discriminatory treatment can occur if an ethnic 
group in the military is deliberately subjected to 
greater danger than other ethnic groups.143
 
In addition to increased risk of death, discrimination 
can occur during military service.  Not surprisingly, 
this mistreatment during military service often 
follows the same pattern as discrimination in society 
in general.  Thus, minority ethnic and religious 
groups are often the target of harassment during 
military service.  However, the military setting often 
allows the mistreatment to occur with both increased 
severity and often impunity.  Furthermore, 
mistreatment while in the military will seldom allow 
for an internal flight alternative and often, by 
definition, negates any possibility of state protection. 
 
Unfortunately, the military service jurisprudence 
seems to accept during military life what would not 
otherwise be accepted during non-military life.  This 
is particularly surprising given the lengthy duration 
and consequent repetition which is frequently a 
characteristic of in-service discrimination.  The 
following circumstances were not found to 
constitute a sufficient level of mistreatment: 
 
When the claimant indicated that the military 
authorities kept him for an extra month, the 
explanation given to him at that time was that 
they needed his services. The claimant did 
not believe this explanation and associated 
this extension of his service with his refusal 
to serve or enlist in the armed forces. He 
frequently referred to the fact that he was 
treated like an "animal," that he was "fed like 
an animal." He speaks of scorpions and 
snakes in Messaad, where he was forced to 
go to live.144
 
18
 “The analysis of military service, perhaps more than any other area 
of refugee law, depends on an accurate understanding of the current 
laws and policies of conscription.” 
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ilitary, discriminatory treatment can occur in the setting of the length of service or 
equent “reserve” service.  If the length of a claimant’s service increases significantly 
ound, such an increase in the length of service can qualify the claimant for protection 
idents [wherein the claimant expressed his opposition to Israeli government policies] and I 
's assertion that as a consequence of them, he received a new call up for military service in 
time he was required to serve had been increased from ten to twenty-four months.  I find that 
hich the claimant was required to serve in the army was increased by fourteen months as a 
 him for his lack of cooperation and his perceived political dissidence.  . . .  I find further that 
ant's service time by fourteen months is a punishment which is sufficiently serious as to 
n. 145  
he jurisprudence, discrimination in length of service can also arise where the 
ion is the “alternate service” of conscientious objectors.  Recent international human 
gests that the imposition of a lengthier alternate service period – as a putative test of 
or’s genuity – constitutes unlawful discrimination.  However, in the context of 
reme lengthening of the period of alternate service would constitute persecution. 
D. OTHER ISSUES 
e jurisprudence remain to be canvassed.  A claim as a military service evader must 
l currently at risk of conscription.146  A fear of future conscription will not be 
cant period of time will lapse until conscription – as would be the case with a child 
upon reaching adulthood.147
service, perhaps more than any other area of refugee law, depends on an accurate 
rent laws and policies of conscription.  The military nature of systems of 
s in a certain secrecy about military service policies.  The problems of determining 
ns with respect to conscription occur even regarding whether conscription is 
country.148  The lack of reliability of information about a country’s compulsory 
s underscored by the previously noted inaccuracies found in reports about the 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
ecommendations of this paper are implicit in the foregoing analysis.  The 
prudence adopted in the foregoing survey is almost completely absent from the 
plicitly, the primary recommendation of this paper is that the jurisprudence more 
wn organization. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the Board and the Court is in 
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“Refugee law’s analysis of the 
issue needs to be seen 
increasingly as a part of the 
larger international human 
rights debate.” 
needs to be incorporated into the analysis of refugee 
law. 
 
International humanitarian law provides a well-
developed body of law which facilitate the 
determination of the legality of a conflict or an 
action within a conflict.  It has recently been 
suggested that refugee jurisprudence in general pays 
little attention to this body of law.  What is true in 
general of refugee jurisprudence, is especially true 
for Canadian refugee jurisprudence on military 
service evasion: with the exception of claims 
involving exclusion, none of the case-law involving 
military service evasion draws directly upon 
international humanitarian law in order to determine 
the validity of conscription.  As noted previously, 
proof of a serious breach of international 
humanitarian law is sufficient to establish that the 
conscription in question is prohibited.  Thus, any 
analysis of whether a conscription is prohibited due 
to the nature of the military action should begin with 
an analysis of the conflict vis-à-vis international 
humanitarian law.  
 
Thirdly, the Canadian jurisprudence needs to end its 
parochialism.  The jurisprudence would benefit from 
the use of foreign analyses of military service 
evasion.  In particular, the House of Lord’s decision 
in Sepet and the Australian High Court’s decision in 
Applicant S. v. Australia (M.I.M.A.)149 could inform 
the jurisprudence’s analysis of, respectively, 
conscientious objection and the application of 
membership in a particular social group to military 
service evaders.  Only very recently, in the matter of 
Hinzman for example, has the Board begun to 
seriously discuss jurisprudence from other common 
law jurisdictions.  In addition, more generally, 
attention to the focus of the American jurisprudence 
on nexus would force the Canadian jurisprudence to 
make explicit some of its implicit assumptions about 
nexus.    
 In this sense, clarity is used to describe a 
jurisprudence which applies an explicit framework 
of analysis and explicitly states its premises and 
conclusions.  Clarity will have both abstract and 
concrete benefits.  Abstractly, clarity will allow for a 
more coherent development of the jurisprudence – 
and allow developments in the area of claims based 
upon military service evasion to occur in unison 
with developments in other areas of refugee law.  On 
a more concrete level, a clear jurisprudence will 
facilitate the presentation of claims by advocates – 
and will provide claimants with a clear 
understanding in advance of whether their evasion 
of military service is likely to ground a claim for 
protection as a refugee.  The organization of the 
jurisprudence adopted in this paper is a preliminary 
attempt to nudge the jurisprudence towards clarity. 
 
Secondly, the jurisprudence must pay explicit 
attention to international law.  Modern refugee law 
was born of  the 1951 Convention; the 1951 
Convention was truly an international agreement 
between states.  As such, refugee law is a subset of 
public international law.  As a subset of public 
international law, refugee law necessarily overlaps 
with other areas, particularly international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law.  
While in other types of claims the refugee 
jurisprudence draws upon these subsets of 
international law, reference to international human 
rights and humanitarian law are desperately absent 
in the military service evasion jurisprudence. 
 
With respect to international human rights law, there 
is a tangled web of international human rights 
instruments, resolutions and pronouncements 
concerning, directly or indirectly, freedom of 
conscience, freedom of opinion and conscription.  
Furthermore, international human rights law has 
engendered much scholarly debate over the extent of 
the state’s right to conscript and conscientious 
objection.  It is intolerable that the jurisprudence 
makes almost no reference to this body of law and 
commentary.  Certainly, the solitude of refugee 
law’s assessment of military service evasion needs 
to end.  Refugee law’s analysis of the issue needs to 
be seen increasingly as a part of the larger 
international human rights debate.   In particular, the 
volumous jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights 
Committee and the European Court of Human 
Rights on military service evasion  20
 Thus, the use of extra-territorial jurisprudence 
provides both an opportunity for the importation of 
new ideas into the Canadian jurisprudence and a 
requirement that the jurisprudence more explicitly 
outline its findings and assumptions. 
 
Fourthly, although largely not discussed in this 
paper, the use of other municipal jurisprudence on 
conscription would likely benefit the Canadian 
jurisprudence.  While conscription is no longer 
practiced in Canada, the existence of conscription 
during both the First and the Second World War 
produced a significant body of case-law delimiting 
the extent of conscription.  At the very least, an 
appreciation of the domestic turmoil caused by the 
imposition of conscription in Canada would perhaps 
decrease the number of condescending remarks in 
the jurisprudence to conscription being simply a 
“law of general application” and an ordinary  
requirement of  citizenship. 
 
The prevalence of the issue of military service in 
refugee jurisprudence is not likely to decrease in the 
future.  It is therefore a worthwhile exercise for the 
judicial and administrative bodies responsible for 
refugee case-law to revisit the underlying principles 
and structure of the jurisprudence on this topic.  
What is now a confusing and, at times, contradictory 
body of law can yet be rehabilitated.  In the end, 
there is yet hope that the jurisprudence will move 
beyond its current ambivalence and troublesome 
terminology.  There is yet hope that the 
jurisprudence will move beyond the “conscientious 
objector”. 
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Appeal cites the negotiation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (A/RES/47/39).  However, the 
Convention had only been opened for negotiations six months previously and entered into force four years 
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Instead, the panel notes that there must be offending military activity by the military forces which is 
condoned in a general way by the state.”) 
58 The exclusion clauses of the 1951 Convention (Articles 1(F)(a) and 1(F)(c)), as imported into Canadian 
law by s. 98 of IRPA, bar from protection as a refugee anyone who has committed a crime against peace, a 
war crime, a crime against humanity; or anyone who has, been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.  As a result of these exclusion clauses, a significant jurisprudence has 
emerged outlining the circumstances which a claimant can be found to be “complicit” in an excluded activity 
and thereby barred from protection as a refugee. 
59 Grahl-Madsen referring to the post-Second World War International Military Tribunal, as quoted in 
Ramirez v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (FCA); followed in Canada (M.C.I.) v. Ashedom, [2001] 
F.C.J. No. 1350 (FCTD). 
60 Moreno v. Canada (M.E.I.) 1 F.C. 298 (FCA).  
61 T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1997) (adopting the model of “partial objector”, the Board states “the 
partial service to which the conscientious objector opposes must be for reasons of an extremely serious 
nature”). 
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 62 Fear of conscription into military service in a military committing widespread prohibited actions is enough 
to establish a refugee claim without any further proof of the conscripts likely involvement in these prohibited 
actions according to TA0-05919 (CRDD, 30 April 2001) at ¶4 and ¶5 (the Board seems to accept compelled 
service in the Rwandan military as a valid basis of claim; however, the Board did not believe that the 
claimant would be subject to conscription, at ¶ 15). 
63 Penate v. Canada (MEI) [1993] F.C.J. No. 1292 at ¶ 6. 
64 Ibid. at ¶ 6.  The test set out in Penate also requires the individual to “[lend] his active support to the 
group”.  However, in the case of a conscript, this aspect of the test is irrelevant since the entire purpose of 
conscripting an individual is to require him to take an active role in the organization in question.  A conscript 
is almost never an inactive member of the military. 
65 This was the case in T99-02481 et al. (CRDD, 29 May 2000) where the claimant was found not be 
excluded due to his involvement in the siege of Vukovar by the Yugoslav army but was found to be at risk of 
a prohibited form of conscription in relation to the conflict in Kosovo. 
66 Al-Maisri v. Canada (MEI) [1995] F.C.J. No. 642 at ¶ 6 (quoting Hathaway’s use of the term). 
67 This comment flows from the Court of Appeal’s criticism of the Board in Zolfagharkhanbi for its “naïve 
and unrealistic” distinction it between “participation and non-participation in military activity” (at ¶ 26). 
68 T99-04510 (CRDD, 2 November 1999) (at ¶ 11: “Nor is there persecution if the penalties for refusing to 
serve are not harsh, except perhaps where the refusal to serve occurs in the context of a military operation 
condemned as contrary to basic rules of human conduct.” [Emphasis added]) 
69 Zolfagharkhani at ¶ 32.  See also fn. 5 in Moreno v. Canada (MEI) [1994] 1 F.C. 298 (FCA).  Most 
recently, this point has been reiterated in Ates v. Canada (MCI) [2004] F.C.J. No. 1599 (FC) at ¶ 16 et seq. 
70 In T95-06356 (CRDD, 30 September 1997) the Board, referring to an inherent nexus  to political opinion, 
states at ¶ 37: “[I]n Zolfagharkhani the Federal Court of Appeal specifically recognized that persecution 
which a claimant faces because of a refusal to perform military service is linked to the ground set out in the 
definition of Convention refugee.” 
71 Ibid. at ¶ 30. 
72 Varga v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1995] F.C.J. No. 888 (FCTD) referring to Ciric v. Canada (MEI) [1993] F.C.J. 
No. 1277 (FCTD).  As noted in the quotation, Ciric was arguably decided on an evidentiary issue (the 
appropriate evidentiary threshold for establishing that a conflict is “condemned by the international 
community”) and not directly on the issue of whether some types of military service evasion is inherently 
political. 
73 Goodwin-Gill states in The Refugee in International Law (1983) at 33 and 34: “Military service and 
objection thereto, seen from the point of view of the state, are issues which go to the heart of the body 
politic. Refusal to bear arms, however motivated, reflects an essentially political opinion regarding the 
permissible limits of state authority, it is a political act.”  This comment by Goodwin-Gill has been 
approvingly referenced in Zolfagharkhani.  See also T95-06356 (CRDD, 30 September 1997).  
74 This gap in the Canadian jurisprudence has been noted in proceedings in other jurisdictions: “One might 
ask . . . [whether] some particularly objectionable form of conflict . . . may be an extra fact that allows the 
punishment for refusing to be called up as perhaps being characterised as having a political opinion, or as 
being for reasons of political opinion. . . . [But] some of the authorities, particularly the Canadian ones, do 
not discuss how one makes that causal link” (Mr. Beech-Jones, Counsel for the Respondent in Szaog et al. v 
MIMIA [2005] HCA 558 (Transcript of hearing of 5 August 2005).  The questioning of the existence of an 
inherent nexus in cases of prohibited compulsory military service may be a side-effect of the RPD’s 
expanded jurisdiction which now allows the Board to grant relief to military service evaders without nexus 
to an enumerated ground.   An example of how this expanded scope of relief may affect judicial reasoning 
on this issue, see Volovich; Ustaoglu v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2003] F.C.J. No. 1285 (FC) at ¶ 11 and Kilic v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] F.C.J. No. 84 (FC) at ¶ 29. 
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 75 As noted at the outset of this discussion of nexus and prohibited conscription, an explicit nexus can often 
be found to political opinion given the heightened political perceptions that often coexist with prohibited 
conscription.  In addition, the category of “membership in a particular social group” can be used as a nexus 
for some individuals fearing prohibited conscription, see implicitly in T92-02882  (CRDD, 23 June 1992), 
U95-04027 (CRDD, 27 August 1996) and Andrade v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2002] F.C.J. No. 69 (FCTD)  and 
T87-9024, (IAB, 29 July 1987).  However, it would seem from the jurisprudence that membership in a 
particular social group is more often cited in cases where conscription is prohibited due to the nature of the 
conscriptor.  For a contrary view, see V91-00261 (CRDD, 28 June 1991) (orally). 
76 It is unclear whether the second and third categories of prohibited military service are sub-categories of 
“contrary to the basic rules of human conduct” (see for example T99-09172 (CRDD, 1 August 2001) at ¶49) 
or separate categories.   
77 A95-01130 (CRDD, 7 February 1997) (concerning the South Lebanese Army at ¶16: “Given the SLA’s 
lack of legal status, there is no issue in regard to enforcement of a law of general application.”)  
78 See Diab v. Canada (MEI) [1994] F.C.J. No. 1277 (FCA), VA0-00816 (CRDD, 19 February 20001), 
Nagendiran v. Canada (MCI), [2003] F.C.J. No. 807, M89-04337 (CRDD, 26 June 1990) and T90-04331 
(CRDD, 17 October 1990) for cases where the illegitimacy of the conscriptor rendered the required military 
service unlawful.  However, see T99-09172 (CRDD, 1 August 2001) for a decision regarding conscription 
by the Taleban in Afghanistan that did not cite its illegitimacy as a reason for conscription to constitute 
persecution and also U91-08581 et al. (CRDD, 19 February 1992) for a decision that found conscription by 
the Mujadehin in Afghanistan not to constitute persecution. 
79 T99-09172 (CRDD, 1 August 2001) (at ¶ 49: “In this case, the claimant objects to forced conscription by 
the Taliban . . . The panel considered his objection to be serious given that the military actions objected to 
are judged by the international community to be contrary to basic rules of human conduct”).  However, non-
state actors will not be presumed by their nature to be committing condemned acts (or acts leading to 
exclusion).  See El-Hasbani v. Canada (M.E.I.), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1269 at ¶ 42 (“The respondent submits 
that armed liberation organizations such as the SLA fall within the category of the type of organizations 
which have committed crimes against humanity as part of their mandate and incidental to their regular 
operations. . . . This is not proof of anything!”). 
80 See for example the jurisprudence on Afghanistan noted in fn. 78, supra.  See also TA1-15461 (RPD, 18 
February 2003) at ¶33 et seq. (finding the unelected government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan to be a 
legitimate conscriptor). 
81 T89-05508 (CRDD, 28 March 1991) and T90-07001 et al. (CRDD, 22 November 1991, S. G. Sri-Skanda-
Rajah) (“Compulsory military service . . . is not a lawful requirement” where no special law had been 
promulgated despite a constitutional provision requiring such a law to be promulgated).  However, for a 
contrary view, see V89-00064 (CRDD, 8 June 1989, C. Groos) (“However, even an illegal act [random arrest 
and detention] in apprehending the claimant does not necessarily mean his obligation to perform military 
service was avoided or that any subsequent steps taken by the Honduran military were illegal”) 
82 See fn. s75 above. 
83 Again, see comments at fn. 17 and 27 supra concerning the American matter of Elias-Zacharias.  
84 See comment at fn. 76, supra. 
85 T90-07001 et al. (CRDD, 22 November 1991, D. Walker).  See also Poologanathan v. Canada (MEI) 
[1996] F.C.J. No. 987 (FCTD) (although dealing with errors of fact by the Board, the Court’s analysis 
assumed that the conscription of a nine year old, albeit by guerillas, provided the basis for a refugee claim); 
and, V98-01920 (CRDD, 13 March 2000) and A99-00710 (CRDD, 19 February 2002).  See also Mohammed 
v. Canada (MCI) [1995] F.C.J. No. 1457 (FCTD) where it was strongly suggested that the conscription of 
children was contrary to international law (and certainly otherwise contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the UN).  The recent decision in Suresh v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2000] F.C.J. No. 5 (F.C.A.) at ¶ 38 to 40 also 
identifies the conscription of children, inter alia, as an indicator of unlawful activity (while the Federal Court 
of Appeal’s decision was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3 
(SCC), the Supreme Court did not disagree with the Court of Appeal’s finding on this matter). 
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 86 Developments in international law include the ILO’s Convention 182: On the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour 38 I.L.M. 1207 (1999) (entered into force 19 Nov. 2000), the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, 54 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000) (entered into force 12 February 2002) 
and Articles 8(2)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court U.N. Doc. 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002)..  For a review of these developments, see UNICEF The 
State of the World’s Children 2005: Childhood Under Threat (UNICEF, Geneva, 2005) esp. Chapter 3 (39 
to 66), Amy Beth Abbott "Child Soldiers: The Use of Children as Instruments of War" Suffolk Transnational 
Law Review 499 (Summer 2000), Michael S. Gallagher “Soldier Boy Bad: Child Soldiers, Culture and Bars 
to Asylum” 13 Int J Refugee Law 310 (July 2001), and Wendy Perlmutter “An Application of Refugee Law 
to Child Soldiers” 6 Geo. Public Pol'y Rev. 137 (Spring 2001).  Interestingly, the scholarly treatment of child 
soldiers seeking asylum similarly presumes persecution without any explicit linkage to international law.  
87 Although it is theoretically possible that military service will be compulsory only for specified “dissident” 
or otherwise disadvantaged groups, the jurisprudence suggests that in practice such a goal is almost always 
pursued by way of de facto enforcement rather than de jure conscription. 
88 The term “disabled” is taken, without comment on its appropriateness, from the international instruments. 
89 See the emphasis on the rehabilitation and special accommodation of the disabled in Declaration on the 
Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. res. 2856 (XXVI), 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 93, U.N. 
Doc. A/8429 (1971); the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. res. 3447 (XXX), 30 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); and, Part I and II of the Standard Rules on the 
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, A/RES/48/96, 85th Plenary Meeting 20 
December 1993.  Insofar as compulsory military service may interfere with the rehabilitation and special 
accommodation of the disabled, it may be prohibited. 
90 See Article 4 of the Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 
No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991. 
91 Ibid.  Article 11. 
92 See for example U95-04027 (CRDD, 27 August 1996) where the claimant claimed a fear of conscription 
“as a young male Guatemalan fearing forced conscription”.  While mistreatment during military service was 
feared as a “member of the Maya Quiche”, his indigenous status was not linked to his fear of conscription 
per se. 
93 See Article 3 of United Nations Principles for Older Persons, G.A. Res. 46/91, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 
74th plen. mtg., Annex 1 U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/91 (1991) which allows the elderly  “to participate in 
determining when and at what pace withdrawal from the labour force takes place”.  Insofar as compulsory 
military service can be understood as contradicting the elderly individual’s determination to retire from the 
workforce, it may be understood as prohibited.  
94 Military inefficiency may not be a complete bar to the recruitment of the elderly.  In the matter of 
Nagendiran v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2003] F.C.J. No. 807 the Federal Court overturned the Board’s finding that 
it was “implausible” that the elderly would be recruited.  No mention was made of a prohibition of the 
recruitment of the elderly in either the Board’s decision or the decision of the Court.  However, the “elderly” 
man in this case was only 52 years of age. 
95 While the Board must not be restricted in its determination of a claim to the particular pleadings of the 
claimant, in the case of conscientious objectors it is impossible to conceive of a situation where the Board 
could confer refugee status on a claimant on the basis of being a conscientious objector without the claimant 
having specifically articulated such objections. 
96 Such a complex and extended debate is impossible to summarize.  In essence, there is some controversy 
over whether the Article 18 of the ICCPR along with the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 
No. 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which interprets Article 18 of the ICCPR 
to restrict the right of states to conscript under Article 8(3)(c)(ii) of the ICCPR) overrides a state’s sovereign 
customary ability to conscript individuals into military service.  With respect to the refugee jurisprudence of 
other jurisdictions, and for a contrary view of the existence of a right to conscientious objection, see most 
notably Sepet. 
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 97 An exception to this proposition is the matter of T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) which reviews 
briefly the international legal basis of conscientious objection. 
98 Musial v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1982] 1 F.C. 290 (FCA) at ¶ 7.  In an immigration context, conscientious 
objection was raised many years before Musial in the matter of Boulis v. Canada (M.M.I) [1974] S.C.R. 875 
(SCC) (on the issue of whether a statutory body had properly exercised its discretion in refusing a stay of 
deportation to a conscientious objector). 
99 T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995). 
100 See VA2-02269 (RPD, 23 September 2003) where the claimant, an atheist, was found not to be credible 
about his conscientious objection.   
101 See fn. 46, supra.  See for example T93-09377, (CRDD, 4 January 1995): “The purely pacifist conviction 
holds that it is morally wrong in all circumstances to bear arms and to kill; the partial pacifist conviction 
objects to the use of force in some circumstances depending upon the purposes or means used. . . . In the 
panel's opinion, to succeed on this leg [partial objection], the claimant must not only show that he holds the 
conviction that it is morally wrong to serve in the Occupied Territories but in addition, he must be able to 
demonstrate that the purposes for being sent to the Occupied Territories or the methods employed there 
would be condemned by the international community”.  See also T92-01693 et al. (CRDD, 2 June 1993): 
“[T]his subjective finding would be sufficient to characterize the husband as a partial conscientious objector, 
and proceed to the next step in the analysis.  . . . the next issue would be whether the type of military action 
engaged in by the IDF in the Occupied Territories is condemned by the international community as contrary 
to basic rules of human conduct.” Most recently, see Bakir v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2004] F.C.J. No. 57 (FC) at ¶ 
30. 
102 T90-07001 (CRDD, 22 November 1991, decision of D. Winkler); T93-11144 et al. (CRDD, 14 June 
1994) (“The male claimant testified that he does not want to kill or be killed.  To me this represents a fear of 
combat and . . . does not form the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution.”); VA1-04412 (RPD, 9 April 
2003) (at ¶30: “What is clear is that the claimant is genuinely afraid of participation in the military sicne the 
recent Intifada.  In this the claimant has the sympathy of the panel.  However, this does not ground his claim 
for refugee status.”) 
103 V96-01788 (CRDD, 15 October 1997) at ¶ 5.  The claim was accepted, inter alia, on the basis of the 
quoted fear.  See also Mouazer v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 423 which at ¶ 18 implicitly accepts 
fear of death while on leave as a  basis of claim. 
104 Kioreskou v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1995] F.C.J. No. 457 at ¶ 15. 
105 VA1-04412 (RPD, 9 April 2003) (at ¶ 22: “In the panel’s view there are means the claimant could have 
utilized – but did not – to have avoided participation in the Israeli military from the very beginning.”); 
upheld by Volovich v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] F.C.J. No. 342 (at ¶ 5 and ¶ 6: “The Board notes, in addition, 
that despite his alleged fear, the applicant did not explore any alternatives to his military service and he never 
expressed his objection to that effect. As a result, the Board did not err in finding that the applicant's 
allegations on this point are unfounded. . . . he Board did consider that the applicant objected to the Israeli 
policy towards Palestinians. The Board did not ignore this element of the applicant's claim. Rather, the 
Board found that the applicant had neither expressed his objection to the Israeli policy nor had he established 
that it led to his personal persecution.”.  See also VA1-04412 for a linkage of a claimant’s failure to avail 
himself of alternate service possibilities with his subjective fear (at ¶ 28: “What is significant with respect to 
this case is that the claimant did not at any time seek the advice of conscientious objectors' organisations in 
order to see if there was a way in which he could avoid service in the military. Equally significant is that he 
never raised an objection with the military about performing his service . . . In the panel's view this is an 
indication that the claimant was not a conscientious objector. It also provides a basis for doubting whether 
his currently stated reasons for not wishing to serve in the reserve are for reasons of conscience.”)  
106 T93-01297 (CRDD, 17 November 1993); see also T91-01081 (CRDD, 2 January 1982) (“The claimant 
had never manifested his belief and had not done anything to avoid military conscription, in spite of the fact 
that he . . . had been of draft age for six years.  The claimant also gave vague and inconsistent explanations 
of his beliefs . . . “). 
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 107 V89-00977 et al. (CRDD, 25 June 1990) (where the claimant’s belief that she should not participate in 
front-line military service conflicted with the stated beliefs of her church, the Seventh Day Adventists). 
108 Talman v. Canada (Solicitor General) [1995] F.C.J. No. 41 (FCTD) (hereafter “Talman”) (at ¶ 17 and 
20: “I do not believe that the Refugee Division erred in its assessment of the evidence relating to the 
applicants' obligation to do military service.  As the Board clearly pointed out, and as the transcript shows, 
the applicants knew that there was compulsory military service in Israel and nonetheless decided to 
immigrate to that country. . . . While recognizing the applicants' frustration, their conduct seems to me to 
have been simply a manoeuvre to establish the grounds for their claims.  I would say the same about their 
objections to military service even before they knew the rules and the exceptions.”).  See also Agranovski  v. 
Canada (M.C.I.) (FCTD, 1996).  While Agranovski reached a different conclusion, it nonetheless applied the 
same test of whether the claimant knowingly immigrated to a country with compulsory military service. 
109 The frustratingly identical nature of the claimants’ pleadings in these cases is matched only by the 
Board’s exceedingly generic responses to these claims.  The Israeli military service evasion cases include a 
quintet of decisions released within six months of each other that are almost completely verbatim identical: 
T93-02756 et al. (CRDD, 24 Noevmber 1993); T93-06478 et al. (CRDD, 1 December 1993); T93-11519 et 
al. (CRDD, 11 May 1994); T93-11144 et al. (CRDD, 14 June 1994); and, T93-04356 (CRDD, 17 June 
1994).  Any reference in the notes to any of these cases can be read as a reference to all of these cases. 
110 Talman at ¶ 17. 
111 This line of cases emerges out of Popov  v.Canada (M.E.I.) [1994] F.C.J. No. 489 and Prokopenkp [2000] 
F.C.J. No. 752 (FCTD) (implicitly at ¶ 5)  See also T93-11519 et al. (CRDD, 11 May 1994) for an example 
of linking (albeit through a concomitant failure of the claimant to explain his objection) prior military service 
with an inability to claim conscientious objector  status (“The male claimant testified that he served in the 
Red Army in the former Soviet Union from 1971 to 1973. . . . [h]e is not therefore a conscientious 
objector”).  More recently, see also VA1-04412 (RPD, 9 April 2003) (at ¶25, in distinguishing a positive 
decision from the present case, the Board noted that the claimant “did serve and continued to do so right up 
until the time of the recent Intifada”); upheld by Volovich v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] F.C.J. No. 342.  See 
also T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (where past military service is mentioned disparagingly). 
112 At the present time in Canada this type of claim has attracted a considerable amount of popular attention.  
In addition to Mr. Hinzman, several other US soldiers have sought protection in Canada in recent months as 
a result of, inter alia, their conscientious objection to participation in the war in Iraq. 
113 T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (“Between 1975 and 1977, the claimant served in the Soviet army in 
East Germany.  He testified that during this period he formed the view that bearing arms is morally wrong.”) 
114 See supra, at fn 17. 
115 The 1951 Convention explicitly recognizes this lack of a requirement by outlining, in Articles 1(E) and 
1(F), categories of individuals who should be excluded from the protection they would otherwise deserve.  
The analogy of this requirement to a new ground of “exclusion” is also found in the jurisprudence, see 
Talman at ¶ 8. 
116 However, see also U91-01411 (CRDD, 11 June 1991) (where the Board found the claimant’s sur place 
protests against, inter alia, conscription into a civil war sufficient to bring him protection as a refugee). 
117 Frisher v. Canada (M.C.I.) [1999] F.C.J. No. 603 (FCTD) (the reference to Talman at ¶ 5 is linked with a 
negative assessment of credibility).  T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (the claimant’s alleged ignorance 
of Israeli compulsory military service when he immigrated was, inter alia, “not consistent with deeply held 
convictions against bearing arms in all circumstances”).  
118 In his defense, the claimant in Talman, supra at fn. 110, asserted that he did not know that the military 
service in question was a prohibited form of military service (in his words, “directed against women and 
children” at ¶ 17).  The Court did not directly address this defense. 
119 T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (“He failed to find out more information from the military; he did 
not approach peace groups and he did not seek legal advice as to his position. In the panel's opinion, it was 
incumbent upon the claimant to investigate the options open to him.” 
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 120T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (“The panel also considered the extent to which the claimant 
participated in the call-up process itself. bile he refused to attend for a medical and was forcibly examined by 
military doctors, he cooperated with the authorities when asked to come in for an interview on two 
occasions.”) 
121 T92-092-01693 et al. (CRDD, 2 June 1993). 
122 V99-02917 (CRDD, 22 December 1999) (the possible punishment is discussed at ¶ 32 to 37; the Board 
concluded at ¶53 that, in the alternative the claimant would be subject to conscription, the punishment “is not 
inordinate or beyond that acceptable within a human rights context for a law of general application.”)    
123 C90-00462 et al. (CRDD, 16 October 1991) (out of a total period of service of 24 months). 
124 VA1-04412 (RPD, 9 April 2003) at ¶ 25 (referring to T95-06356). 
125 Repeated prosecution refers to repeating the cycle of conscription and prosecution for failure to be 
conscripted.  T93-09377 (CRDD, 4 January 1995) (“repeat prosecution might in certain circumstances 
become persecution.”) 
126 T90-01685 (CRDD, 24 December 1990). 
127 T89-07396 (CRDD, 17 May 1990). 
128 See above at fn.121. 
129 Order of Harrington, J. in the matter of Ates v. Canada (M.C.I.) Federal Court file no. IMM-150-04 (12 
October 2004, as amended 25 October 2004) (unreported). 
130 The decision in the matter of Ates has not yet been issued.  The result of the appeal were communicated 
to the author by the appellant, Mr. Ates (Personal communication by email, 6 October 2005). 
131 As noted in the Federal Court’s decision, this characterization of the Board was “hotly contested” by Mr. 
Ates and his counsel.  However, ultimately the Court deferred to the Board on this issue. 
132 However, with respect to similarly situated individuals, simply showing that the government “often” 
refuses to grant requests for conscientious objector status does not necessarily indicate it will do so in the 
case of the claimant (see Slavkovic v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1995] F.C.J. No. 975 (FCTD) at ¶ 5). 
133 Popov at ¶ 8. 
134 Vakiriak v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1682 (FC) at ¶ 3 and ¶ 4. 
135 Zolfagharkhani, at ¶ 19 to 22. 
136 IRB Interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition in the Case Law (Immigration and Refugee 
Board, Legal Services, Ottawa, December 2002) (as revised December 2003) at § 9.3.6. 
137 T92-01693 et al. (CRDD, 2 June 1993) “Without entering into the quagmire of determining whether the 
inclusions and exclusions in the statute are reasonable and appropriate to its purposes, we do not believe that 
the class ‘Druze and Jews who are not Orthodox Jew full time Torah scholars’ can reasonably be 
characterized as natural.  It is a law arbitrary . . . . It does not flow from the inherent nature of military 
service, but contains a myriad of political, religious and ethnic considerations”.  However, see T93-13420 
(CRDD, 3 April 1996) at ¶ 66 for a different conclusion on the same law. 
138 T90-07001 et al. (CRDD, 22 November 1991, S. G. Sri-Skanda-Rajah) (“The poor and rural Salvadoran 
males between the ages of 14 and 30 are differentially targeted for forcible recruitment into the military 
service.”); V89-00064 (CRDD, 8 June 1989, G. S. Chrysomilides) (“[H]e is also a member of a social group 
composed of citizens who because of their economic conditions and social class (family of peasants) are 
unable to resist forced recruitment by the army.”) 
139 This gendered characteristic is particularly strong in prima facie legitimate conscription.  While guerilla 
groups sometimes conscript females (although generally in smaller numbers than males), national 
governments rarely extend compulsory military service to females. Of course, Israel is the notable exception 
to this rule.  
140 The only extensive analysis of males as a particular social group in relation to military service is the now 
dated decision of the Board in V89-00074 (CRDD, 5 June 1990). 
141 T96-03054 et al. (CRDD, 8 July 1997) at ¶ 42. 
142 A94-01191 et al. (CRDD, 30 July 1996) (at ¶ 35 “Therefore the alleged military conscription was in 
actuality a form of involuntary manual labour that was, in itself, a form of persecution and was not the 
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